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ABSTRACT: In this study, we relax the conventional assumption of a linear cointegration 
relationship in the revenue-expenditure nexus by examining asymmetric equilibrium effects in 
the South African fiscal budget using quarterly data collected between 1960:Q1 and 2016:Q2. 
Our mode of empirical investigation is the MTAR model supplemented with a TEC 
component. Our estimation results can be summarized into three main empirical findings. 
Firstly, we find that the long-run elasticity between revenue and expenditure is less-than-unity 
which implies that the fiscal budget is weakly unsustainable. Secondly we find that positive 
‘shocks’ to the fiscal budget are eradicated fairly quickly which means that fiscal authorities 
must implement their policies in a continuous, on-going fashion over the long run. Lastly, we 
observe bi-directional causality between revenues and expenditures which offers support in 
favour of the fiscal synchronization hypothesis. This last result implies that fiscal authorities 
should amend fiscal imbalances through increased consolidation between revenue collection 
and expenditure allocation. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Following the bankruptcy filing by the Lehman brothers in September 2008, the world 
economy experienced the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. In response to the 
financial crisis and the subsequent global recession, most economies worldwide adopted 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies which have caused governments to run large budget deficits in 
order to boost economic recovery. For European countries, excessive accumulation of fiscal 
debt eventually lead to the European sovereign debt crisis of 2009. In African countries, debt 
accumulation has not been as severe as in the Euro area, and yet it should be noted that African 
countries have been historically characterized by governments which lack adequate fiscal 
discipline. Therefore, African governments naturally possess persistent fiscal imbalances, 
which has forced policymakers to rely more on monetary policy instruments in pursuing 
macroeconomic stability. More often than not, this reliance on monetary policy has proven to 
be unsuccessful in providing macroeconomic stability for African economies. Thus concerning 
African economies, fiscal sustainability is regarded as a more suitable policy option that can 
be used to lessen short-run fluctuations in important economic variables such as income, output 
and employment. 
 
Developments which occurred subsequent to the sub-prime crisis have re-ignited an 
important debate on fiscal sustainability in African countries. One of the key themes in the 
debate concerns the expenditure-revenue relationship and it’s effect on the budget deficit. For 
an emerging African economy like South Africa, which displayed impressive fiscal 
sustainability by boasting a budget surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP and 1 percent of GDP 
respectively in the two fiscal years before the crisis (i.e. 2006/2007 and 2007/2008), the debate 
is quite substantial. In particular, the need to know the relationship between the budget deficit 
and the expenditure-revenue correlation is important for the South African government because 
government expenditure plays a key factor in eradicating the lingering social ills of the 
Apartheid regime as well as being instrumental in reducing the existing wide poverty gap. In 
also considering the deterioration of government debt metrics since 2008 and the resulting 
downgrade of South African government debt rating by all three major credit rating agencies 
(i.e. Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch ratings) further emphasizes the need for 
government to improve fiscal prudence in the form of lowering the current fiscal deficit. So 
far, the 2015 medium term budget policy statement (MTBPS) highlights government plans of 
returning to fiscal sustainability by reducing it’s expenditures while simultaneously increasing 
it’s tax revenue over a rolling three-year period of 2016-2019. It is thus important for South 
African fiscal authorities to know the nature and dynamic relationship between government 
expenditure and revenue.  
 
Notably, the relationship between government expenditure and revenue in South Africa 
has not gone un-investigated as the issue has been addressed in the previous empirical studies 
of Narayan and Narayan (2006), Nyamongo et. al. (2007), Lusinyan and Thornton (2007), 
Ndahiriwe and Gupta (2010), Ghartey (2010), Jibao et. al (2012) and Baharumshah et. al. 
(2016). Nonetheless, the empirical results presented by the aforementioned authors tend to 
present conflicting evidences hence making it difficult to draw precise policy implications form 
these studies as a collective unit. One plausible explanation to these contradictions in empirical 
results, is that most of these studies have conducted their empirical investigation under linear 
econometric frameworks. Recently, it has been speculated that relying on such linear empirical 
models may produce spurious results and there exists three explanations which argue for the 
presence of asymmetries in the adjustment process of fiscal policy. The first is attributed to the 
closeness between the budget and the business cycle due to the presence of automatic 
stabilizers as well as the observation that business cycles display asymmetric behaviour 
(Paleologou, 2013). The second explanation is that policymakers may react in a different way 
to changes in a deficit or surplus (Baharumshah et. al., 2016). Lastly, the response of taxpayers 
to changes in the effective tax rate or tax base may lead to asymmetric differences in the budget 
(Ewing et. al., 2006). 
 
So far, the study of Baharumshah et. al. (2016) has investigated the possibility of 
asymmetric cointegration relations in the expenditure-revenue nexus for the case of South 
Africa using the TAR model and MTAR threshold cointegration model of Enders and Siklos 
(2001). And even so, the authors have been unsuccessful in capturing asymmetries in the 
relationship and resolved to rely on conventional symmetric error correction modelling to 
establish the intended relationship. We attribute this failure of capturing asymmetric 
cointegration effects to three shortcomings associated with the preceding study. Firstly, the 
authors employ annual data which, as demonstrated by Ndahiriwe and Gupta (2010) for a 
similar case of South Africa, tends to produce insignificant cointegration effects between 
government expenditure and revenue. A more viable option, as shown by the Ndahiriwe and 
Gupta (2010), would be to use quarterly data in empirical investigations. Secondly, the study’s 
transformation of the raw data into logarithmic form, naturally linearizes the data, hence 
minimizing the possibility of capturing any possible asymmetric cointegration relationship 
between the time series. Therefore, in order to effectively capture nonlinearities in the data, 
one must perform the empirical analysis on raw, quarterly data. In this present study, we do so 
by examining the empirical relationship between government expenditure and revenue by 
employing quarterly data over a twenty year period ranging from 1994:Q1 to 2016:Q2. 
Methodological, our study follows a host of other empirical works (i.e. Ewing et. al. (2006), 
Payne et. al. (2008), Zapf and Payne (2009), Saunoris and Payne (2010), Young (2011), 
Apergis et. al. (2012), Paleologou (2013) and Tiwari and Mutascu (2015)) in using the MTAR 
framework to model asymmetric cointegration relations between revenue and expenditure for 
developed economies. To the best of our knowledge, there currently exists no other study for 
sub Saharan African (SSA) countries which has used the MTAR framework to successfully 
model asymmetric cointegration between revenue and expenditure. Our study therefore bridges 
an important gap in the empirical literature. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
fiscal budget in South Africa. Section 3 is the literature review which discuss both theoretical 
and empirical literature on the subject matter. Section 4 articulates the empirical models used 
in the study whereas section 5 presents the empirical results of the study. The study is 
concluded in section 6 in the form of policy implications and directions for future research. 
 
2 An overview of the fiscal budget in South Africa 
 
In retrospective, South Africa’s fiscal budget position in the post-World War  
II period can be conveniently described as evolving over three phases. The first phase can be 
approximated from the period ranging from the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 until the end of 
the Apartheid regime in 1994 and can be described as the unstable phase. Notably during this 
phase the South African economy entered into a new political era of ‘Grand Apartheid’ during 
the 1960’s; a large portion of the fiscal budget was spent on military expenditure items; political 
tensions began to heighten from the early 1960’s through to the early 1990’s; the world 
economy experienced a downward trend throughout the 1980’s; international sanctions were 
imposed on the South African economy between 1977 and 1993, there was a large brain drain, 
massive disinvestment and capital outflows experienced during the 1980’s, a foreign debt 
standstill was imposed against national treasury in 1985 as well as the country experiencing a 
severe drought period in the early 1990’s; soaring rates of inflation from 1973 to 1979. As a 
consequence of this host of historic events, the fiscal deficit displayed unstable tendencies 
averaging 2.34 percent of GDP during the 1960’s, 4.13 percent of GDP during the 1970’s and 
2.82 percent of GDP during the 1980’s. 
 
The second phase corresponds with the periods dating from the democratic elections of 
1994 up until the global recessionary period of 2009 and can be referred to as the improving 
phase of the fiscal budget. During this phase the newly-elected ANC government began to take 
stringent fiscal policy measures to address the social and economic imbalances caused by over 
fifty years of the Apartheid regime. In order to do so the government implemented three 
successive, large scale fiscal programmes. The first programme was the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) which saw fiscal authorities designate numerical fiscal 
budgets targets inclusive of a budget deficit target of 2.5 percent of GDP as well as the 
attainment of a stable tax-to-GDP ratio of 25 percent. To this end, the Katz tax commission 
was assigned the responsibility of improving tax collection and administration in the interest 
of meeting expenditure obligations and ultimately reducing fiscal borrowing pressures. Even 
though the deficit fell from 5.1 to 4.6 percent of GDP between 1994 and 1996, fiscal authorities 
had not attained the set 2.5 percent target goal. This was mainly due to the fact that the RDP 
programme ignored the gathering of new taxes through the expansion of the tax base and rather 
focused on fiscal prudence and the reallocation of existing public revenues (Phiri, 2016). Thus 
in 1996 the RDP was replaced by a second policy programme the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) policy which envisioned the government’s budget deficit and tax 
policies as key to transforming South Africa into a competitive, outward oriented economy as 
stipulated in the “Washington Consensus”. Notably, it is under the GEAR policy that the fiscal 
budget began to tremendously improve with the budget deficit being lowered from 5.4 to 0.3 
percent of GDP between 1996 and 2005. However, the GEAR policy was heavily criticized on 
the basis of placing too much emphasis on the government budget deficit at the expense of 
microeconomic reforms which would address deeper social issue such as unemployment and 
income inequality. This eventually led to the abandonment of the GEAR programme in favour 
of a third fiscal programme the ASGISA programme in 2005 which focused more on 
microeconomic reforms. 
 
The ASGISA programme stands as a fiscal policy which transcends from the second to 
the third phase in fiscal budget developments. Initially, the fiscal budget performance under 
the ASGISA programme began on a very high note, with record high budget surpluses of 0.6 
and 1 percent of GDP in 2006 and 2007, respectively. However, the collapse of the Lehman 
Brothers in 2008 which triggered the worldwide recessionary period of 2009 marks the 
beginning of the third phase of fiscal budget evolution and is representative of a deteriorating 
phase of budget developments. During this phase the economy managed to achieve post-
Apartheid record high budget deficits of 6.3, 4.7 and 4.7 and 5 percent of GDP in the 
consecutive years of 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. In 2013, fiscal authorities decided on 
abandoning the ASGISA programme, and began running number of alternative policy 
programmes such as the National Development Plan (NDP), New Growth Path (NGP), 
Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) and the South African National Infrastructure Plan 
(SANIP) which are designed to specifically address the country’s triple challenge of poverty, 
inequality and unemployment. On the revenue collection side, the Davis Tax Committee was 
appointed in 2013 to boost revenue collections through tax reforms in order to fund these key 
policy programmes with emphasis placed on infrastructure development. However, despite 
these developments, the budget deficit averaged a relatively high rate of 4.3 percent of GDP 
between 2013 and 2015, and this by itself highlights the challenge facing fiscal authorities in 
returning the budget to sustainable levels experienced prior to the recessionary period. 
Nonetheless, the three discussed phases of developments in the fiscal budget are easily 
identified in Figure 1 which presents the time series movement of South Africa’s fiscal budget 
as a percentage of GDP between 1960 and 2015. 
 
  
Figure 1: Fiscal budget as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
3 Literature Review 
 
3.1 Theoretical propositions of the revenue-expenditure nexus 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between revenues and expenditure is 
considered a classical problem of public economics. So far, there are four propositions that 
have been put forward in the literature concerning the revenue-expenditure relationship. Firstly, 
there is the tax-and-spend hypothesis which was put forward by Friedman (1978) and 
Buchanan and Wagner (1978). According to this view, tax revenue is the cause of government 
expenditure although Friedman (1978), on one hand, argues for a positive relationship between 
the variables whereas Buchanan and Wagner (1978), on the other hand, contend for a negative 
relationship. In terms of policy implications, Friedman (1978) suggests that a decrease in taxes 
will reduce fiscal expenditure and eventually lower the budget deficit whilst an increase in tax 
revenue is accompanied by increases in public expenditure which results in fiscal imbalances. 
Conversely, Buchanan and Wagner (1978) speculate that cuts in direct taxes create a fiscal 
illusion in which the public will speculate that the cost of government programs has fallen. As 
a result the public will demand for more public spending which if undertaken will result in 
increased government expenditure and ultimately higher budget deficits. Therefore the panacea 
for budget deficits in such a circumstance would be an increase in taxes with a preference on 
indirect taxes as a cheaper alternative for financing expenditures, even though this may come 
at the expense of higher interest rates and inflation which would lead to crowding out of private 
sector spending (Tiwari and Mutascu, 2016). 
 
The second proposed hypothesis found in the literature is commonly referred to as the 
displacement effect hypothesis. This hypothesis comes courtesy of the works of Peacock and 
Wiseman (1979) and is consider as one the most reliable explanations of the revenue-
expenditure relationship. Under this hypothesis, government expenditure is the cause of 
government revenue and not vice versa. Peacock and Wiseman (1979) particularly observe that 
during periods of crisis governments tend to increase their expenditure levels as a form of a 
fiscal stimulus packages and consequentially, the temporary increases in government 
expenditure can lead to permanent increases in government revenues over the long-run. In other 
words, governments tend to spend first then attempt to recover public expenditure through 
increased revenue collections. Notably, this view is associated with the Keynesian principle of 
compensatory finance whereby deficits are created in order to boost up levels of economic 
activity. Then through the workings of a built-in mechanism, the budgetary multiplier effect 
would itself eliminate any output gap and ensure a higher tax base, from which the extra tax 
revenue would be generated to offset the initial created fiscal deficit (Obinyeluaku, 2015). 
However, pursuing such a course of fiscal action may exert negative effects on shareholders 
and investors and may even cause them to mitigate to other countries since further increases in 
taxes are generally expected. The appropriate policy stance in this situation is to reduce state 
expenditures which would then reduce tax revenue collection and ultimately lower the budget 
deficit. 
 
The third theoretical propositions was initially proposed by Musgrave (1966) and later 
refined by Meltzer and Richard (1981). According to the authors, government’s decision on 
the optimal levels of revenue and expenditure spending depends on the public’s attitude 
towards the welfare maximizing demand for public goods and services as well as on their 
attitudes towards the redistribution function of the government (Konukcu-Onal and Tosun, 
2008). Thereafter, government weighs the costs and benefits of its activities against the 
corresponding costs before committing to a fiscal program and consequentially, government 
revenue and expenditure interact interdependently. This gives rise to the fiscal synchronization 
hypothesis in which fiscal revenue and expenditure exert bi-directional causality and hence 
improvements on both fiscal revenue and expenditures are required in order to make 
improvements on the budget deficit. To illustrated the fiscal synchronization hypothesis, Barro 
(1979) developed a tax-smoothing model based on the Richardian invariance theorem, stating 
that deficit-financed government expenditure today results in future tax liabilities which are 
fully capitalized by tax payers (Nyamongo et. al., 2007).This implies that fiscal authorities 
must take simultaneous decisions on revenues and expenditures in order to conserve a balance 
budget approach to fiscal policy. 
 
The final theoretical proposition, known as the fiscal neutrality or institutional 
separation hypothesis, suggests that there exists no causal relationship in the revenue-
expenditure relationship and thus decisions concerning government revenue and expenditure 
are taken independently. This hypothesis is rooted in the studies of Wildavsky (1988) and 
Baghestani and McNown (1994). There are two rational explanations for the dynamics 
surrounding the institutional separation neutrality hypothesis. Firstly, no causality between 
revenues and expenditures can occur when institutions responsible for revenue collection and 
disbursement of government outlays are separate, as is the case for federal governments 
(Ghartey, 2010). Secondly, in the case of parliamentary system of government, it can occur if 
the Minister of Finance, who controls both institutions of government, fails to coordinate the 
cost of government activities with associated benefits, because of parochial party reasons 
(Ghartey, 2010). The achievement of fiscal balance would thus be a matter of pure coincidence 
since taxation decisions are made independently of decisions to allocate public spending. 
Moreover, the greater the conflict between among different legislative and executive 
government institutions, the more difficult it is to successfully implement deficit-reducing 
measures (Obinyeluaku, 2015). 
 
3.2 Empirical review of the literature  
 
From an empirical point of view, there exists a prolific literature which has sought to 
determine whether a country or a panel of countries can be categorized as being in conformity 
with either i) the tax-and-spend hypothesis ii) the displacement effect hypothesis iii) the fiscal 
synchronization hypothesis, or iv) the institutional separation hypothesis. For convenience 
sake, these studies can be broken down into four main groups of literature. The first group are 
the early empirical studies which used vector autoregressive (VAR) frameworks to investigate 
the direction of causality established between fiscal revenue and expenditure exclusively for 
the US economy (i.e. Blackley (1986), Anderson et. al. (1986), Von Furstenburg et. al. (1986), 
Manage and Marlow (1986), Miller and Russek (1990), Ram (1988), Bohn (1991), Jones and 
Joulifain (1991) and Hoover and Sheffrin (1992). The second group of studies are the panel 
studies which can be further disseminated into five sub-groups. The first sub-group investigates 
for European countries (i.e. Joulifain and Mookerjee (1991), Owoye (1995), Koren and 
Stiassny (1998), Garcia and Henin (1999), Kollias and Makrydakis (2000), Kollias and 
Paleoloou (2006), Afonso and Rault (2009), Chang and Chiang (2009) and Bolat (2014)); the 
second sub-group investigates for Latin American countries (i.e. Baffes and Shah (1994), 
Ewing and Payne (1998) and Cheng (1999)); the third sub-group for Asian countries (i.e. 
Narayan (2005), Karim et. al. (2006), Mehrara et. al. (2011), Magazzino (2014)), the fourth 
sub-group for African countries (i.e. Wolde-Rufael (2008), Ghartey (2010) and Magazzino 
(2012)) and the last sub-group for studies on mixed economies (i.e. Chang et. al. (2002) 
Mehrara et. al. (2012), Petanlar and Sadeghi (2012) and Mutascu (2015)). 
  
The third group of studies investigated the revenue-expenditure nexus for individual 
countries and this cluster of studies is more inclusive of the contribution Latin American, Asian 
and African empirical literature to the revenue-expenditure debate. Some notable works 
belonging to this group of research studies include Huang and Tan (1992) for Taiwan; Li (2001) 
for China; Provopoulos and Zambaras (1991), Kollias and Makrydakis (1995), Katrakilidis 
(1997) for Greece; Bella and Quinteri (1995) for Italy; Hatemi-J and Skukur (1999) for Finland; 
Koren and Stiassny (1995) for Austria; Park (1998) for Korea; Al-Quadir (2005) for Saudi 
Arabia; Murat and Murat (2009) and Al-Zeaud (2014) for Jordan; Valeriu (2010) and Jalil and 
Hye (2010) for Romania; Lukovic and Grbic (2014) for Serbia; Mithani and Khoon (1999), 
Tsen and Ping (2005), Taha and Loganathan (2008), Hong (2009), and Nanthakumar et. al. 
(2011) for Malaysia; Darrat (1998), Aslan and Tasdemir (2009) and Dogan (2013) for Turkey; 
Al-Khulaifi (2012) for Qatar; Aisha and Khatoon (2010) and Ali and Shah (2012) for Pakistan; 
Elyasil and Rahimi (2012) for Iran; Moalusi (2004) for Botswana; Carneiro et. al. (2005) for 
Guinea-Bissau; Eita and Mbazima (2008) for Namibia; Obioma and Ozughalu (2010), 
Aregbeyen and Ibrahim (2012), Elyasil and Rahimi (2012), Ogujibuba and Abraham (2012), 
Nwosu and Okafor (2014) for Nigeria; Keho (2010) for Ivory Coast; Obeng (2015) and 
Takumah (2015) for Ghana; and finally Nyamongo et. al. (2007), Lusinyan and Thornton 
(2007) and Ndahiriwe and Gupta (2010) for South Africa.  
 
The final group of empirical studies investigate possible nonlinear relationship between 
government revenue and expenditure. The main idea behind this group of studies is that the 
sustainability of the fiscal budget switches depending upon whether an economy is above or 
below some threshold estimate. Belonging to this cluster of nonlinear studies are the works of 
Bajo-Rubio et. al. (2004, 2006) for the Spanish economy; Arestis et. al. (2004), Ewing et. al. 
(2006), Zapf and Payne (2009), Gil-Alana (2009), Cipollini et. al. (2009) and Young (2011) 
for the US economy; Paleologou (2013) for 3 EU countries; Apergis et. al. (2012), Athanasenas 
et. al. (2014) for the Greek economy; Aworinde (2013) and Aworinde and Ogundipe (2015) 
for the Nigerian economy; Keho (2011) for Cote d’Ivoire; Payne et. al. (2008) for the Turkish 
economy; Tiwari and Mutascu (2015) for the Romanian economy, Saunoris and Payne (2010) 
for the UK economy and Jibao et. al. (2012) and Baharumshah et. al. (2016) for the South 
African economy. Notwithstanding the inexhaustible literature on the subject matter, the 
collective verdict on the relationship between revenue and expenditure remains inconclusive. 
A comprehensive summary of the reviewed studies is provided in Tables 1a) through 1d) in 
the appendix of the paper.  
 
4 Methodology 
 
The empirical literature examining the sustainability of budget deficits is primarily 
concerned with whether or not the government’s intertemporal solvency constraint is violated. 
The empirical model used in our study begins with the assumption that government finances 
its deficits with bonds which have a one year maturity period. Denoting Bt as government debt; 
Gt as government’s purchase of goods, services and transfer payments; Rt as government’s 
revenues and it as the real interest rate, the government’s one-period budget constraint at time 
t is specified as: 
 
𝐺𝑡 + (1 + 𝑖𝑡)𝐵𝑡−1 = 𝑅𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡        (1) 
 
Solving equation (1) for Bt and iterating forward over an infinite horizon yields the 
following intertemporal budget constraint: 
 
𝐵0 = ∑ ∏ (1 + 𝑖𝑡)
−1𝑡
𝑖=1 (𝑅𝑡+𝑠 − 𝐺𝑡+𝑠) + lim
𝑠→∞
∏ (1 + 𝑖𝑡)
−1𝐵𝑡+𝑠
∞
𝑖=1

𝑠=0   (2) 
 
Intertemporal budget solvency requires that the current debt must be financed by 
surpluses in future periods such that as time approaches infinity the discounted value of the 
debt converges to zero. This assumption is realized through the imposition of the following 
transversality condition: 
 
lim
𝑠→∞
(1 + 𝑖𝑡)
−1𝐵𝑡+𝑠 = 0        (3) 
 
If equation (3) holds then the intertemporal budget balance is satisfied hence ensuring 
that government operates its fiscal budget in absence of a Ponzi scheme. Substituting equation 
(3) into equation (2) implies that a sustainable intertemporal budget exists when maturing debt 
obligations are not ‘bubble-financed’ by the issuing new debt. This is also equivalent to saying 
that the fiscal budget is sustainable only if government debt is not expected to grow as fast, on 
average, than the mean real interest rate, with the latter term denoting a proxy for the growth 
rate of the economy (Bajo-Rubio et. al., 2006). In order to draw an empirical cointegration 
relationship between Rt and Gt, Haikko and Rush (1991) further assume that the real interest 
rate evolves as a stationary process. This enables the authors to transform equations (1) through 
(3) into the following empirical regression: 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝑡 + µ𝑡          (4)
 
 
 Where µt is a well-behaved error correction term. Moreover, the fiscal budget is deemed 
strongly sustainable if Rt and Gt are cointegrated and 1 = 1; weakly sustainable if Rt and Gt 
are cointegrated and 0 < 1 < 1; and unsustainable if 1  0. According to the classic Engle and 
Granger (1987) theorem, cointegration between Rt and Gt can be validated under the following 
two conditions. Firstly, both Rt and Gt variables must be found to be first difference stationary 
time series (i.e. I(1) processes). Secondly, the extracted long-run cointegration error term, µt, 
must be a levels stationary process (i.e. I(0) processes). In order to increase the effectiveness 
of the testing procedure for cointegration effects, Enders and Silkos (2001) devise a method 
which involves modelling the long-run equilibrium error term as the following threshold 
cointegration process: 
  
µ𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡1µ𝑡 + (𝐼𝑡 − 1)1µ𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ∆𝜉𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑡     (5) 
 
Where the indicator functions are defined as: 
 
.𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓𝜇𝑡−1 ≥ 𝜏
0, 𝑖𝑓𝜇𝑡−1 < 𝜏
         (6) 
 
𝑀.𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓𝜇𝑡−1 ≥ 𝜏
0, 𝑖𝑓𝜇𝑡−1 < 𝜏
        (7) 
 
The term  is the threshold estimate of the equilibrium error which is responsible for 
regime switching behaviour and is consistently estimated using the minimization criterion 
described in Hansen (2000). Combining equation (5) and (6) results in the TAR model which 
allows the degree of autoregressive decay to depend on the state variable of interest (Enders 
and Granger, 1998). On the other hand, combining equation (5) with (7) results in the MTAR 
model which allows a variable to display different amounts of autoregressive decay depending 
on whether it is increasing or decreasing (Enders and Siklos, 2001). The coefficients of the 
threshold error terms, 1 and 2, measure the rate of equilibrium adjustment for positive shocks 
(i.e. 1) and for negative shocks (i.e. 2) to the intertemporal budget. If 1 > 2, then positive 
shocks to the intertemporal budget are eradicated quicker than negative shocks to the budget. 
On the other hand, if 1 < 2, then negative shocks to the intertemporal budget are eradicated 
quicker than positive shocks to the budget. These coefficients are also used to further test for 
two empirical hypotheses which are meant to validate threshold cointegration. Firstly they are 
used in testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration effects (i.e. H10: 1 = 2 = 0) against the 
alternative of linear cointegration effects (i.e. H11: 1 ≠ 0, 2 ≠ 0) using a conventional F-
statistic. Under the second test, the null hypothesis of a linear cointegration effects is tested as 
H20: 1 = 2, and this is tested against the alternative hypothesis of an otherwise threshold 
cointegration effects i.e. H21: 1 ≠ 2, this time using a modified F-statistic. Only if both tests 
statistics exceed their critical values, can one conclude on significant threshold cointegration 
effects among the time series and obtain ‘non-spurious’ regression estimates for the 
coefficients 0, 1, 1 and 2 from equations (4) and (5). 
 
5 Data and empirical results 
 
5.1 Data description and unit root tests 
 
The data used to carry out our empirical analysis consists of the quarterly series of i) 
total expenditure by national government (i.e. Rt) ii) total national government revenue (i.e. Gt) 
and iii) the fiscal budget deficit/surplus expressed as a ratio of GDP((i.e. FBt). All data has 
been retrieved from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) online database over the period 
1960:Q1 to 2016:Q4. As a preliminary step before investigating possible threshold 
cointegration effects, we firstly examine the integration properties of the individual time series 
variables. To this end, we employ three unit root tests namely; the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(i.e. ADF), the Kwiatkowski et. al. (1992) (i.e. KPSS) and the Hylleberg et. al. (1990) (i.e. 
HEGY) tests. Whereas the ADF and HEGY unit root tests have the unit root as the null 
hypothesis, the KPSS tests presents a stationary null hypothesis. Moreover, the HEGY test 
differs from the ADF and PP test in that it tests for the presence of unit roots at different 
frequencies. For empirical purposes the HEGY is performed at a zero frequency (i.e. 
HEGY[tpi1]) and at semi-annual frequency (i.e. HEGY[tpi2]). All unit root tests are performed 
without a constant or a trend and the results of the empirical exercise are reported in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Unit root test results 
unit root test time  series 
 Rt ΔRt Et ΔEt FBt ΔFBt 
ADF -0.10 -15.51*** -0.08 -15.69*** -4.73*** -17.01*** 
KPSS 8.94*** -0.02 -7.44*** 0.02 0.19 0.01 
HEGY[t(pi1)] 1.41 -7.98*** 1.37 -7.71*** -1.35 -7.73*** 
HEGY[t(pi2)] -0.98 -1.09*** -1.70 -2.15** -1.83* -2.13*** 
Note: “***”, “**” and “*” denote the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively. Δ denotes a first difference operator. 
Lag length for the unit root tests are determined by the AIC. 
 
As is evident from our unit root test results, both revenues and expenditures time series 
cannot reject the unit root null hypothesis in their levels for both ADF and HEGY unit root 
tests whereas the fiscal budget cannot rejects the unit root hypothesis for the same tests. 
However, in their first differences the ADF and HEGY statistics manage to reject the unit root 
null at all levels of significance levels. Concerning the KPSS test statistics, the revenue and 
expenditure time series reject the stationary null at all critical levels whereas the stationary null 
cannot be reject for the fiscal budget time variable. Conversely, the KPSS statistics cannot 
reject the stationary null for all the observed time series in their first differences. In 
summarizing these results, we conclude on revenues and expenditure being I(1) first difference 
time series whereas the fiscal budget is a stationary I(0) variable. Notably, these results are in 
coherence with the previous studies of Narayan and Narayan (2006), Nyamongo et. al. (2007), 
Lusinyan and Thornton (2007), Ndahiriwe and Gupta (2010), Ghartey (2010), Jibao et. al 
(2012) and Baharumshah et. al. (2016) and this permit us to proceed to model and estimate our 
threshold cointegration models. 
 
5.3 Threshold cointegration analysis and error correction modelling 
 
Having confirmed that the revenue and expenditure time series are first difference 
stationary process, we proceed to our threshold cointegration analysis of the time series 
variables. As previously discussed, before any estimation of the threshold models we must first 
test for two null hypothesis of cointegration and threshold cointegration effects in order to 
validate the existence of threshold cointegratioin between the time series variables. The results 
of the empirical tests are summarized in Table 2 below. The F-statistic, , which tests the first 
null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of cointegration effects, produces 
estimates of 112.22 and 122.38 for the TAR and MTAR models, respectively. Note that these 
F-values exceed their critical values at all levels of significance. We also test a second 
hypothesis of linear cointegration against the alternative of threshold cointegraton using the 
modified F-statistic denoted as *. We obtain a modified F-value of 1.75 for the TAR model 
which fails to reject the linear cointgration hypothesis at all critical levels. On the other hand, 
the F-value of 3.51 obtained for the MTAR model manages to reject the linear null at a 10 
percent significance level hence providing sufficient evidence of MTAR threshold 
cointegration among the time series. Other studies in the literature which find similar findings 
of the suitability of the MTAR as opposed to the TAR cointegration model between revenue 
and expenditure include Ewing et. al. (2006), Payne et. al. (2008), Young (2011) and Apergis 
et. al. (2012). 
 
Table 2: Threshold cointegration tests 
dependent variable Model  * 
 
 
revt 
TAR 122.22 
(0.00)*** 
1.75 
(0.46) 
 
MTAR 122.38 
(0.00)*** 
3.51 
(0.21)* 
Notes: Significance levels: ‘***”, ‘**’, ‘*’ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. p-values of test statistics are reported 
in parentheses. 
 
Having confirmed threshold cointegration effects between the time series, we proceed 
to estimate the MTAR threshold model of revenue-expenditure. The empirical results of the 
OLS estimates of the long-run regression coefficient between government revenue (i.e. 1) and 
expenditure as well as the estimates for the coefficients of the threshold error terms (i.e. ρ1 and 
ρ2) are reported in Table 3. Based on the results reported in Table 3 below, it should be firstly 
observed that the long-run regression coefficient produces a less-than-unity elasticity of 0.67 
and judging by it’s associated p-value, this is a highly significant estimate. Generally, this result 
implies that, over the long-run, the fiscal budget is weakly sustainable with fiscal taxes 
collections being able to cover only 67 percent of the corresponding expenditure items. This is 
a rather plausible result seeing that the South African government has been operating at a 
budget deficit for most of the time during the period of our investigation (i.e. 1960 – 2016). 
Notably, other authors who report less-than-unity elasticity include Nyamongo et. al. (2007) 
for South Africa, Payne et. al. (2008) for Turkey, Zapf and Payne (2009) for the US, Saunoris 
and Payne (2010) for the UK, Paleologou (2013) for Germany and Greece, and Tiwari and 
Mutascu (2016) for Romania. 
 
In turning to the coefficient estimates of the threshold error terms, we obtain an estimate 
of -1.18 for ρ1 and -0.91 for ρ2 which are both significant estimates at all critical levels. Since 
1 > 2, then our obtained results particular result implies that there is quicker equilibrium 
reversion following a positive shock to governments budget whereas equilibrium adjustment 
is slower following a negative shock to the budget. In other words, the speed of adjustment 
when the budget is improving is faster than when the budget is worsening and hence it is more 
problematic to adjust budgetary deficit as opposed to budget surpluses. Collectively, the 
estimation results obtained from our MTAR cointegration model imply that whilst the fiscal 
budget is weakly sustainable as a whole, periods of budgetary disequilibrium are easier to 
correct for budget surpluses when compared to that of budget deficits. We note that similar 
inferences have been drawn from the study of Apergis et. al. (2012).  
 
  
Table 3: MTAR regression estimates 
 estimate standard error t-value p-value 
coefficients     
0 4.71 1.09 4.33 0.00*** 
1 0.67 0.04 14.93 0.00*** 
threshold error term estimates 
ρ1 -1.18 0.12 -9.73 0.00*** 
ρ2 -0.91 0.08 -11.40 0.00*** 
 3.47 
RSS 2.91 
R2 0.50 
F-statistic 112.4 
p-value 0.00*** 
Notes: Significance levels: ‘***”, ‘**’, ‘*’ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
 
Given our evidence of threshold cointegration between government revenue and 
expenditure permits us to model threshold error correction effects as a means of capturing 
short-run and long-run asymmetric adjustment equilibrium dynamics between the observed 
time series. In denoting γ-𝜇t-1 and γ+𝜇t-1 as the threshold error correction terms, the 
corresponding TEC specification for the MTAR model is given as: 
 
𝛥𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜓𝑖𝛥𝑅𝑡−1 +
𝑛
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝛥𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛾
−𝜇𝑡−1(𝛥𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 < 𝜏)
𝑞
𝑖=1 + 𝛾
+𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1(𝛥𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 ≥
𝜏) + 𝜈𝑡1           (10) 
 
𝛥𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜓𝑖𝛥𝑅𝑡−1 +
𝑛
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝛥𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛾
−𝜇𝑡−1(𝛥𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 < 𝜏)
𝑞
𝑖=1 + 𝛾
+𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1(𝛥𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 ≥
𝜏) + 𝜈𝑡2           (11) 
 
 The term γ-ectt-1 measures of the speed of equilibrium revision below its threshold 
estimate whereas γ+ectt-1 measures it below the threshold. Based on the TEC regressions (10) 
and (11), two hypotheses can be further tested for. Firstly, the null hypothesis of no asymmetric 
TEC effects can be tested as H30: γ- = γ+ and this hypothesis is tested against the alternative of 
an otherwise threshold error correction mechanism i.e. H31: γ- ≠ γ+. Once the null hypothesis is 
rejected in favour of the alternative of a TEC effects, then causality tests can be performed on 
the time series. The null hypothesis that revenue does not granger cause expenditure is tested 
as H40: 𝜓i = 0, i=1,…,k, whereas the null hypothesis that expenditure do not granger cause 
revenue is tested as H50: 𝛿i = 0, i=1,…,k. Table 3 summarizes the results of the tests for TEC 
effects, the TEC model estimates as well as the granger causality results. All three null 
hypotheses, that is H30, H40 and H50, are tested using a conventional F-test statistic.   
 
Table 4: Threshold error correction (TEC) estimates  
dependent 
variable 
independent 
variable 
estimate standard 
error 
t-value p-value 
 intercept 3.32 0.38 8.78 0.00*** 
 𝑅𝑡−1
−  0.06 0.09 0.65 0.52 
 𝑅𝑡−1
+  -1.04 0.11 -9.85 0.00*** 
Rt 𝐺𝑡−1
−  0.02 0.08 0.21 0.84 
 𝐺𝑡−1
+  -0.72 0.08 -9.46 0.00*** 
 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
−  -0.62 0.08 -7.78 0.00*** 
 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
+  -0.30 0.15 -2.01 0.04** 
 
 intercept 1.74 0.47 3.68 0.00*** 
 𝑅𝑡−1
−  0.04 0.11 0.37 0.71 
 𝑅𝑡−1
+  -0.62 0.13 -4.68 0.00*** 
Gt 𝐺𝑡−1
−  -0.42 0.09 -4.39 0.00*** 
 𝐺𝑡−1
+  -0.74 0.09 -7.75 0.00*** 
 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
−  0.33 0.10 3.33 0.00*** 
 𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1
+  0.68 0.18 3.69 0.00*** 
hypotheses tests, causality tests and diagnostic tests 
H03: - = + 4.40 
(0.04)** 
H04: i=0  11.67 
(0.00)*** 
H05: i = 0 50.22 
(0.00)*** 
DW 1.98 
(0.85) 
LB(4) 0.00*** 
LB(8) 0.00*** 
LB(12) 0.00*** 
Notes: Significance levels: ‘***”, ‘**’, ‘*’ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. p-values of hypotheses tests and 
diagnostic tests are reported in parentheses. DW and LB respectively denote the Durbin Watson and Ljung Box statistics and for serial 
correlation with the LB test being performed up to 12 lags.  
 
In referring to the results reported in Table 4 above, we firstly note that in testing the 
null hypothesis of no asymmetric error correction effects we obtain a F-statistic of 4.40 which 
manages to reject the null at a 10 percent significant level (thus indicating asymmetric error 
correction effects within the system of estimated regressions). We also note that the while error 
correction terms, γ-𝜇t-1 and γ+𝜇t-1, of the revenue equation (10) both produce negative and highly 
significant estimates of -0.62 and -0.30, respectively, the error correction terms of the 
expenditure equation (11) both produce significantly positive estimates of 0.33 and 0.68, 
respectively. And because only the threshold error correction terms from the revenue equation 
produce the correct sign on the coefficients, we conclude that only government revenue 
responds to budgetary disequilibrium whereas this is not the case for government expenditure. 
Specifically, our results entail that government revenues respond to both an improving and to 
a worsening budget, with 62 percent of budgetary disequilibrium being corrected by revenues 
during a worsening budget whereas 30 percent of disequilibrium being corrected by revenues 
during an improving budget. This results concur with those obtained earlier from our MTAR 
estimates by entailing that disturbances to improving budgets are easier to ‘correct’ than for 
worsening budgets. Concerning short run effects, we observe highly significant coefficients for 
𝑅𝑡−1
+ and 𝐺𝑡−1
+  variables in the revenue equation in the upper regime of the model (i.e. t-1  ). 
By interpretation, this implies that short-run effects are present when revenue responds to 
budgetary disequilibrium and the budget is improving.  
 
In lastly examining the results of our causality tests as reported at the bottom of Table 
4, we find that the F-statistics estimate testing the null hypothesis that revenue does not granger 
cause expenditure is 11.67 and this statistic exceeds it’s critical value at a 5 percent level of 
significance. Similarly, the F-statistics testing the null hypothesis that expenditure does not 
granger cause revenue produces an estimate of 50.22 and this statistic exceed it’s critical value 
at all significance levels. By effect, this result implies bi-directional causality between 
government revenues and expenditure for the South Africa economy and this offers support in 
favour the fiscal synchronization hypothesis. Notably, the previous studies of Nyamongo et. 
al. (2007), Lusinyan and Thornton (2007), Ghartey (2010) and Baharumshah et. al. (2016) 
confirm similar bi-directional causality between the time series for South African data albeit 
using varying linear empirical methods to arrive at such conclusions.  
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Subsequent to the global recession period of 2009, many researchers have been inclined 
to investigate the sustainability of the fiscal budget by examining cointegration effects between 
fiscal revenue and expenditure. From this group of studies, there has recently emerged a new 
wave of empirical research which hypothesizes on a nonlinear revenue-expenditure 
relationship serving as a more plausible description of the relationship between the time series 
variables. In acknowledgment to the absence of empirical works depicting such a nonlinear 
relationship between revenues and expenditures for developing as well as African countries, 
this current study sought to bridge this gap with an application to the South African economy 
which is well known for it’s superior fiscal governance among SSA countries. Using the 
MTAR model coupled with a corresponding TEC component applied to quarterly time series 
collected between 1960:Q1 to 2016:Q2, our study was able to provide sufficient evidence of a 
nonlinear revenue-expenditure cointegration relationship for the data. 
  
Our empirical results particularly show that the fiscal budget is weakly sustainable with 
an elasticity estimate of less-than-unity. This finding is not surprising given the unsustainability 
of South Africa’s budget during our period of study, more prominently for periods extending 
from the mid-1970’s through to the early 1990’s. Our estimation results further reveal, that 
positive disturbances to the fiscal budget are corrected at a quicker rate than negative ones. We 
find this result to be plausible since it adheres to recent historical data accounts. For instance, 
during the global recession period of 2009 fiscal authorities were obligated to provide fiscal 
stimulus packages to boost economic recovery. These events caused negative shocks to the 
fiscal budget which have lingered on until this present day and the fiscal deficit has since 
averaged values last experienced in the pre-Apartheid era. Note that this result is in accordance 
with our MTAR estimates which find that worsening budgets are more difficult to control than 
improving budgets. Furthermore, the results obtained from our causality tests suggests that 
there existsan exploitable interlink between revenues and expenditures as is reminiscent of the 
fiscal synchronization hypothesis. This particular finding holds strength in our case study since 
it concurs with findings of the bulk majority of previous South African studies (i.e. Nyamongo 
et. al. (2007), Lusinyan and Thornton (2007), Ghartey (2010) and Baharumshah et. al. (2016)). 
 
So, what then are the relevant policy implications that can be derived from our empirical 
study? For starters, in view of South Africa’s weakly sustainable budget, fiscal authorities are 
encouraged to undertake stringent measures which will improve the current fiscal budgetary 
stance. In particular, the current fiscal deficit is an indication that revenue collections are not 
on par with government expenditures items. Given the crucial role which government 
expenditure plays in supporting the unemployment and poverty eradication goals stipulated in 
the recent NGP and NDP macroeconomic policies, it would be absurd to expect drastic cuts in 
government revenues as a means of cutting the budget deficit in order to an end of fiscal 
sustainability. The onus therefore lies with tax authorities to ensure that revenue collections are 
up-to-date with fiscal expenditure obligations.  
 
Currently, the Davies Tax Committee has been assigned the responsibility of 
undertaking a number of tax reform measures in order to widen the base for tax collections. 
However, our empirical analysis indicates that pursing such ‘positive shocks’ to the fiscal 
budget will be eradicated fairly quickly. Therefore such tax reforms should be implemented as 
a continuous, on-going process over the long-run. In also considering our finding in support of 
the fiscal synchronization hypothesis, we further advise tax authorities to work closely with 
other fiscal institutions in moving towards a common goal of fiscal sustainability. As a natural 
development to our study, future research can take the following two courses. Firstly, from a 
revenue collection standpoint, future studies can probe into finding the optimal tax structure 
mix of direct and indirect taxes which will be most beneficial for the South African economy. 
Secondly, from an expenditure perspective, future research can focus on determining the 
optimal level of government spending conducive for economic prosperity in South Africa.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table 1a: Review of the associated literature: Early empirical works 
Author 
 
Country/Countries Period Methodology Findings 
Anderson et. al. (1986) US 
 
1946-1983 Granger causality GEGR 
Blackley (1986) US 
 
1929-1982 Granger causality GEGR 
Von Furstenburg et. al. 
(1986) 
US 1954-1982 VAR GEGR 
Manage and Marlow 
(1986) 
US 1929-1982 Granger causality GEGR 
Miller and Russek 
(1990) 
US post-World War II VAR and ECM GEGR 
Ram (1988) US 
 
1929-1983 Granger causality GRGE 
Bohn (1991) US 
 
1792-1988 ECM GRGE 
Jones and Joulifain 
(1991) 
US 1972-1860 ECM GEGR 
Hoover and Sheffrin 
(1992) 
US 1954-1779 UDL GRGE 
Note: GE represents government expenditures, GR represents government revenue, GEGR means expenditure granger causes revenue, 
GRGE means revenues granger causes expenditure, GEGR means that there is bi-directional causality between expenditure and revenues, 
GEGR means there is no causality between the variables. VAR, ECM and UDL denote vector autoregressive, error correction model and 
unrestricted distributive lag model, respectively. 
 
Table 1b: Review of the associated literature: Panel studies 
Author 
 
Countries Period Methodology Findings 
European countries 
Joulifain and Mookerjee 
(1991) 
22 OECD countries 1961-1986 VAR Italy and Canada: 
GRGE. 
 
Austria, Finland, 
France, Greece, Japan, 
UK, US: GEGR. 
 
Australia, Belgium, 
Denmark, Iceland, 
Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland: 
GEGE. 
 
Ireland: GEGR. 
Owoye (1995) 7 European countries 1961-1990 ECM Italy and Japan: 
GRGE. 
 
Canada, France, 
Germany, UK, US: 
GEGR.  
Koren and Stiassny 
(1998) 
9 European countries 1953-1992 Structural VAR Germany, Netherlands, 
UK, US: GRGE. 
 
Austria, France, Italy: 
GEGR. 
 
Sweden and 
Switzerland: GEGR.  
Garcia and Henin 
(1999) 
5 European countries 1960-1996 ECM Canada, France, 
Germany, US: 
GRGE. 
 
Japan: GEGR. 
Kollias and Makrydakis 
(2000) 
Greece, Spain, Portugal 
and Ireland. 
1960-1995 ECM Spain: GRGE. 
 
Greece and Ireland: 
GEGR. 
 
Portugal: GEGE. 
Kollias and Paleoloou 
(2006) 
15 EU countries 1960-2002 VECM Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland: GEGR. 
 
Netherlands, Portugal 
Sweden: GEGE. 
 
Finland, France, Italy, 
Spain, UK: GRGE. 
Afonso and Rault 
(2009) 
25 EU countries 1998-2006 Panel granger causality 
tests 
Italy, France, Spain, 
Greece, Portugal: 
GEGR. 
 
Belgium, Germany, 
Austria, Finland, UK: 
GRGE. 
 
 
Chang and Chiang 
(2009) 
15 OECD 1992-2006 Panel VAR GEGR 
Bolat (2014) 10 EU countries  1980-2013 Panel granger causality 
tests 
GEGR. 
Latin American countries 
Baffes and Shah (1994) 3 Latin American 
countries 
1895-1985 ECM Brazil: GRGE. 
 
Argentina and Mexico: 
GEGR. 
Ewing and Payne (1998) 5 Latin American 
countries 
1950-1994 ECM Columbia, Ecuador, 
Guatemala: GRGE. 
 
Chile and Paraguay: 
GEGR. 
Cheng (1999) 8 Latin American 
countries 
1949-1995 Granger-causality tests Columbia, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, 
Paraguay: GRGE. 
 
Chile, Panama, Brazil, 
Peru: GRGE. 
Asian countries 
Narayan (2005)  9 Asian countries 1960-2000 Conditional ECM Indonesia, Nepal, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka: 
GRGE. 
 
India, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Thailand, 
Philippines: GEGE. 
Karim et. al. (2006) ASEAN-5 countries 1970-2000  Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines: GEGR. 
 
Thailand and Singapore: 
GRGE.  
Mehrara et. al. (2011)  40 Asian countries 1995-2008 Panel cointegration and 
panel causality tests 
GRGE. 
Magazzino (2014) 10 ASEAN countries 1980-2012 Panel cointegration and 
individual causality tests 
Brunei, Thailand: 
GEGE. 
 
Cambodia, Vietnam: 
GRGE. 
  
Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore: GRGE.  
 
Myanmar: GEGR.  
 
African countries 
Wolde-Rufael (2008) 13 African countries 1964-2003 VAR Burkina Faso: GEGR. 
 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Mali, Zambia: 
GRGE. 
 
Mauritius, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe: GRGE. 
 
Botswana, Burundi, 
Rwanda: GEGE. 
Ghartey (2010) Kenya, Nigeria and 
South Africa 
1960-2007 ARDL Kenya: GRGE. 
 
Nigeria and South 
Africa: GRGE. 
Magazzino (2012) 15 ECOWAS countries 1980-2011 Granger causality tests Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Guinea Bissau, Ghana: 
GEGE. 
 
Burkina Faso, Senegal, 
Togo, Guinea, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone: 
GEGR. 
 
Mali: GRGE. 
 
Niger, Gambia, Cape 
Verde: GRGE. 
Mixed economies 
Chang et. al. (2002) 10 developed and 
developing countries 
1951-1996 ECM Japan, Lebanon, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Tunisia, 
UK, US: GRGE. 
 
Australia and South 
Africa: GEGR. 
 
Canada: GRGE. 
 
New Zealand and 
Thailand: GEGE. 
Petanlar and Sadeghi 
(2012) 
15 oil exporting 
countries 
2000-2009 Panel VAR and panel 
causality tests 
GRGE. 
 
Mehrara et. al. (2011) 11 oil exporting 
countries 
1980-2009 Panel cointegration and 
panel granger causality 
tests 
GRGE. 
Mutascu (2015) PIIGS countries 1988-2014 Bootstrap panel granger 
causality tests 
Greece and Italy: 
GRGE. 
 
Portugal: GRGE. 
 
Ireland and Spain: 
GEGE. 
Note: GE represents government expenditures, GR represents government revenue, GEGR means expenditure granger causes revenue, 
GRGE means revenues granger causes expenditure, GEGR means that there is bi-directional causality between expenditure and revenues, 
GEGR means there is no causality between the variables.  
 
 
Table 1c: Review of the associated literature: Single country analysis 
Author 
 
Country Period Methodology Findings 
Provopoulos and 
Zambaras (1991) 
 
Greece  Granger causality tests GEGR 
Huang and Tan (1992) 
 
Taiwan 1951-1987 VAR GRGE 
Bella and Quinteri 
(1995) 
 
Italy 1866-1989 VECM GEGR 
Kollias and Makrydakis 
(1995) 
 
Greece 1950-1990 VECM GEGR 
Koren and Stiassny 
(1995) 
 
Austria 1954-1992 VAR GEGR 
Katrakilidis (1997) 
 
Greece 1974-191 VECM GEGR 
Darrat (1998) Turkey 1967-1994 VECM GRGE 
Park (1998) 
 
Korea 1964-1992 VECM GRGE 
Hatemi-J and Skukur 
(1999) 
 
Finland 1960-1997 VAR GRGE 
Mithani and Khoon 
(1999) 
 
Malaysia 1970-1994 VECM GEGR 
Li (2001) 
 
China 1950-1997 VAR and VECM GEGR 
Moalusi (2004) 
 
Botswana 1976-2000 VECM GRGE 
Al-Quadir (2005) 
 
Saudi Arabia 1964-2001 VECM GEGR 
Carneiro et. al. (2005) 
 
Guinea-Bissau 1981-2002 VECM GEGR 
Tsen and Ping (2005) 
 
Malaysia 1965-2002 VECM GRGE 
Lusinyan and Thornton 
(2007) 
South Africa 1895-2015 VAR 1985-1960: GEGR 
1962-2005: GEGR 
1985-1960: GEGR 
    
Nyamongo et. al. (2007) 
 
South Africa 1994-2004 VAR GEGR 
Eita and Mbazima 
(2008) 
 
Namibia 1977-2007 VAR GRGE 
Taha and Loganathan 
(2008) 
 
Malaysia 1970-2006 VAR GEGR 
Hong (2009) Malaysia 1970-2007 VECM GEGR 
     
Aslan and Tasdemir 
(2009) 
 
Turkey 1950-2007 Granger causality tests GEGR 
Murat and Murat (2009) 
 
Jordan 1950-2007 VECM GEGR 
Aisha and Khatoon 
(2010) 
 
Pakistan 1972-2007 VECM GEGR 
Keho (2010) Ivory Coast 1960-2005 ARDL, VAR and 
VECM 
 
GRGE 
Ndahiriwe and Gupta 
(2010) 
 
South Africa 1960-2005 VECM GEGR 
Obioma and Ozughalu 
(2010) 
 
Nigeria 1970-2007 VECM GRGE 
Jalil and Hye (2010) 
 
Romania 1998-2008 ARDL GEGR 
Valerui (2010) 
 
Romania 1995-2007 VECM GEGE 
Nanthakumar et. al. 
(2011) 
 
Malaysia 1970-2009 ARDL GRGE 
Ali and Shah (2012) 
 
Pakistan 1976-2009 VECM GEGE 
Al-Khulaifi (2012) 
 
Qatar 1980-2011 VECM GRGE 
Aregbeyen and Ibrahim 
(2012) 
Nigeria 1970-2008 ARDL GRGE 
Elyasil and Rahimi 
(2012) 
 
Iran 1963-2011 ARDL GEGR 
Ogujibuba and Abraham 
(2012) 
 
Nigeria 1970-2011 VECM GRGE 
Dogan (2013) Turkey 1924-2011 VECM GEGR 
 Al-Zeaud (2014) 
 
Jordan 1990-2011 VECM GEGR 
Lukovic and Grbic 
(2014) 
 
Serbia 2003-2012 VAR GEGR 
Nwosu and Okafor 
(2014) 
 
Nigeria 1970-2011 VAR and VECM GEGR 
Obeng (2015) 
 
Ghana 1980-2013 VAR GRGE 
Takumah (2015) Ghana 1986-2012 VECM GEGR 
Note: GE represents government expenditures, GR represents government revenue, GEGR means expenditure granger causes revenue, 
GRGE means revenues granger causes expenditure, GEGR means that there is bi-directional causality between expenditure and revenues, 
GEGR means there is no causality between the variables. 
 
Table 1d: Review of the associated literature: Nonlinear studies 
Author 
 
Country/Countries Period Methodology Findings 
Arestis et. al. (2004) US 1947-2002 TAR unit root tests Stationary process when 
the ratio of the budget to 
GDP is below the 
threshold of -0.313.  
Unit root process when 
the ratio of the budget to 
GDP is above the 
threshold of -0.313.  
 
Bajo-Rubio et. al. 
(2004) 
Spain 1964-2001 TAR unit root tests The ratio of the budget 
to GDP is low persistent 
below the threshold of -
1.90.  
The ratio of the budget 
to GDP is highly 
persistent above the 
threshold of -1.90.  
 
Bajo-Rubio et. al. 
(2006) 
Spain 1964-2003 
1982-2004 
TVECM Above the threshold of 
5.30 and 7 for the ratios 
of general and central 
government deficit as a 
ratio of GDP, immediate 
adjustment would lead 
to a fall in the deficit 
and vice versa.   
 
Ewing et. al. (2006) US 1958-2003 TAR and MTAR Asymmetric 
cointegration. 
Revenues and 
expenditures respond to 
worsening budgets but 
not to improving ones. 
GEGE in the short-run. 
GEGR in the long-
run. 
 
Cipollini et. al. (2009) US 1947-2004 TVECM Fiscal authorities should 
intervene in the budget 
only when real deficit 
per capita exceeds a 
threshold of 8.859.  
 
Payne et. al. (2008) Turkey 1968-2004 TAR and MTAR 
cointegration model 
No asymmetric 
cointegration, 
GRGE. 
 
Zapf and Payne (2009) US 1959-2005 TAR and MTAR 
cointegration model 
No asymmetric 
cointegration 
 
Gil-Alana (2009) US 1947-1992 Fractional integrated 
TAR and MTAR 
cointegration model 
Very little evidence of 
asymmetric 
cointegration. 
 
Saunoris and Payne 
(2010) 
UK 1955-2009 TAR and MTAR 
cointegration model 
Asymmetric 
cointegration. Revenues 
and expenditures 
respond to worsening 
budgets quicker than to 
improving ones. 
GEGR over long-run. 
 
Keho (2011) Ivory Coast 1960-2007 TVECM  Asymmetric 
cointegration. 
GRGE in periods of 
budget deficit. 
GEGR in periods of 
budget surplus. 
 
Young (2011) US 1959-2007 TAR and MTAR 
cointegration model 
Asymmetric 
cointegration. Revenues 
and expenditures 
respond to worsening 
budgets quicker than to 
improving ones. 
 
Apergis et. al. (2012) Greece 1957-2009 TAR and MTAR 
cointegration model 
Asymmetric 
cointegration with 
GEGR in the short 
run and GEGR in the 
long-run. 
 
Jibao et. al. (2012) South Africa 1960-2008 LSTECM Equilibrium adjustment 
is quicker during a 
deficit and lower during 
a surplus. 
 
Aworinde (2013) Nigeria 1961-2012 Nonlinear causal tests GRGE 
 
Paleologou (2013) Sweden, Greece and 
Germany 
1965-2009 TAR and MTAR 
cointegration model 
 
No asymmetric 
cointegration in Sweden 
and Germany, GEGR 
in both countries.  
Asymmetric 
cointegration in Greece 
with GEGR.  
 
Piergallini and 
Postigliola (2013) 
Italy 1861-2012 STR The ratio of the budget 
to GDP is low persistent 
below the threshold of -
1.10.  
The ratio of the budget 
to GDP is highly 
persistent above the 
threshold of -1.10. 
 
Athanasenas et. al. 
(2014) 
Greece 1999-2010 NARDL Asymmetric 
cointegration with 
GEGR 
 
Tiwari and Mutascu 
(2015) 
Romania 1999-201 TAR and MTAR 
cointegration model 
Asymmetric 
cointegration. Revenues 
and expenditures 
respond to worsening 
budgets quicker than to 
improving ones. 
GEGR  
 
Aworinde and Ogundipe 
(2015) 
 
Nigeria 1961-2012 TAR and MTAR 
cointegration model 
Asymmetric 
cointegration. Revenues 
and expenditures 
respond to worsening 
budgets quicker than to 
improving ones. 
GEGR 
 Baharumshah et. al. 
(2016) 
South Africa 1960-2013 TAR and MTAR 
cointegration model 
No asymmetric 
cointegration 
Note: GE represents government expenditures, GR represents government revenue, GEGR means expenditure granger causes revenue, 
GRGE means revenues granger causes expenditure, GEGR means that there is bi-directional causality between expenditure and revenues, 
GEGR means there is no causality between the variables. TAR and MTAR represent threshold autoregressive and momentum threshold 
autoregressive models respectively. TVECM denotes the threshold vector error correction model. NARDL is the nonlinear autoregressive 
distributive lag model. 
